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The conventional wisdom of South African ethnologists, whether liberal or conservative, 
has been dominated by the idea that African polities operated according to certain 
fixed rules (tlcustomsw) which were hallowed by tradition and therefore never 
chaaged. (1) A corolla-ry of this is that, if these rules could be correctly identified 
and fairly applied, everyone would be satisfied and chiefship could perhaps be 
saved. (2) It is, however, fairly well established that genealogies are often 
falsified, that new rules are coined and old rules bent to accommodate changing 
configurations of power, and that "age-old" customs may turn out to be fairly recent 
innovations; in short, that "organisational ideas do not directly control action, 
but only the interpretation of actionr1. (3) This conventional wisdom was successfully 
challenged by Comaroff in an important article, Itchiefship in a South African 
Homelandt1, which demonstrated that, by adhering too closely to the formal features of 
traditional government and politics among the Tswana, especially those concerning 
succession, the Government wrecked the political processes which had enabled the 
'Pswam to choose the most suitable candidate as chief. (4) And yet Comarofffs article 
begs a good many questions. Let us imagine that the Government ethnologists read the 
article, and as a result allow Tswana chiefs to compete for office as before, 
permitting flconsultative decision-making and participation in executive processes". (5) 
Would this prevent the Tswana chiefship from dying? Can we, in fact, discuss chiefship 
in political terms alone without considering whether the material conditions in which 
it flourished still exist? The present article will attempt to situate the question of 
chiefship in a somewhat wider framework than that usually provided by administrative 
theory or transactional analysis. 
The Ciskei - Historical Background (6) 
The last effective Paramount Chief of all the Xhosa (not to be confused with 
the Mpondo, Thembu, Mpondomise and Wengu, who are today all lumped together as 
~hosa) was Phalo (reigned c.1715-1775). By the time of his death his kingdom 
stretched from east of the Mbashe river to west of Fort Beaufort and the Bushmans 
River. The various chiefs of the royal Tshawe clan competed with each other for 
followers and prestige, subject to his loose authority. During Phalo's reign, a 
quarrel between his sons, Gcaleka (d.1778) and Rbarhabe (d.1782) laid the foundations 
of a split which divided the Xhosa into two great sections, the amaGcaleka of the east 
aYld the m a r h a b e  of the west. Yet another dynastic quarrel split the amBharhabe 
into the amaNgqika and the amaNdlambe (war of Thuthula, 1807-8). During the frontier 
wars of the early nineteenth century, a political and territorial wedge was driven 
between the amaGcaleka and the amaRharhabe. In 1847, the Rharhabe territory was 
annexed as "British Kaffrarias', the forerunner of the modern Ciskei, whereas the 
amaGcaleka, who were driven across the Kei, were eventually incorporated into the 
Transkei. A corridor of white settlement (comprising modern East London-Stuttenheim- 
Queenstown) kept the two apart. As a result, the Rharhabe chief (sometimes called 
the Ngqika chief) became recognized as a second Paramount, junior to the Gcaleka 
Paramount. The position was further complicated when, at the end of the Frontier 
War of 1878-9, the Colonial Government drove all the amaNgqika into the Kentani 
District of the Traaskei, leaving the Ciskei to the Mfengu and to other m a r h a b e  
(such as the ama~dlambe) whom it considered politically more reliable. 
l The other ethnic group in the Ciskei, usually called the Mfengu (a name 
they generally dislike), is actually composed of several distinct Nguni-speaking 
l 
I peoples, the most important of which are the Bhele, the Zizi and the Hlubi. They 
fled Natal at the time of Tshakafs wars (1818-1828) and entered Xhosa country, 
seeking service. As a client group, they were certainly not treated on an equal 
I footing with the Xhosa, and the Colonial Government was able to play on their 
l 
l grievances to draw them into an anti-Xhosa alliance. The Mfengu played no small part 
in the eventual European victory, and the Xhosa remember with special bitterness that 
the Mfengu helped discover the hidden grain-pits which sustained the Xhosa fighters in 
the long drawn-out Frontier War of 1850-3. As a reward for their collaboration, the 
Mfengu were granted large tracts of Xhosa laad. Since the Mfengu alliance was 
cultural as well as military, they acquired the western skills and education which 
enabled them to dominate the better paid jobs, such as teachers, clerks, traders and 
clergymen. The Xhosa have not yet caught up, with the result that their historical 
grievance has acquired social and economic dimensions. 
The Xhosa Chiefdom in the Pre-Colonial Period 
W. H. Hammond-Tooke calls Xhosa chiefdoms "tribal democracies". (7) Inasmuch 
as this quaint term indicates that there was no chiefly despotism, that the councillors 
retained considerable power, and that decisions wexe usually taken by consensus, he is 
correct. However, it is important to appreciate that this desirable state of affairs 
did not arise from the fact that the Xhosa were more enlightened or more humane or had 
better political theorists than anyone else. Rather, it was the product of the balance 
of forces at the particular conjuncture of a struggle in which the chiefs were 
endeavouring to extend their control over all spheres of their subjects' lives. The 
institution of chiefship was not part of the original dispensation among the Nguni .  
The people were at one time organized into clans (kinship groups). At some time before 
1600, certain clans came to dominate others, subdued them and turned them into 
commoners under their chiefship. Subjection was acknowledged through the payment of 
tribute, and the chief was entitled to certain services, mostly judicial and military, 
from his subjects. There was a limit to what the chief could demand from his subjects, 
however, and these limits were circumscribed by two crucial variables: relative 
abundance of land and its concomitant, relative scarcity of population; and the low 
level of technology required for pastoral production. It was impossible for the chiefs 
to secure their domination by purely economic means, and their political position was 
also not very strong. The nucleus of a chief's personal following was made up of the 
men who had been circumcised with.him, and of young men who came to serve at his Great 
Place in return for their bridewealth cattle. Since land and cattle were readily 
available, the ease with which a poor man could set himself up as an independent 
homestead-head prevented the emergence of a permanent client force. In order to obtain 
a substantial following, the chief had to win the support of the influential commoners, 
known in the ethnographic jargon as clan-section heads. Host of the commoner clans had 
broken up, but their senior members (clan-section heads) still commanded the hereditary 
respect and obedience of their kinsmen. They were the link between the chief and the 
vast majority of homestead-heads who, despite the nominal ownership of the chief, were 
the true possessors of the land and cattle of the country. (once the chief had 
accepted the homestead-head as his subject, he could not impede his access to the land, 
and he could not, except in special circumstances, appropriate his property. ) It was 
the clan-section heads who executed the chief's orders, collected his tribute and 
furnished him with warriors. They are usually known as councillors because they sat 
on the chief's council but their power depended on their own followings and not on the 
favour of the chief. The influence of the councillors was enhanced by the competition 
between chiefs. All sons of the chiefs became chiefs and consequently the numbers of 
chiefs looking for subjects increased every generation. Dissatisfied councillors could 
desert singly or en masse, taking their followers and. their cattle to a rival chief. 
Eben headstrong chiefs usually backed down in the face of such a threat. The 
councillors could even dismiss the chief from office. 
This last statement may seem rather startling to those who are accustomed to 
believe that chiefs were born not made, and it therefore seems necessary to discuss this 
point in some detail. The ascriptive nature of hereditary office-holding inhibited 
but did not eliminate competition between chiefs. On the surface, the rules are clear 
enough: all sons of chiefs are chiefs, and they axe ranked according to the rank of 
their mother. The heir to the chiefship is the son of the Great Wife, who is usually 
a Thembu. The bridewealth for the Great Wife is paid by all the people, a,nd her status 
is publicly proclaimed. Yet, despite the clarity of the rules, it was possibIe to 
circumvent them. This was made easier by the fact that the Great Wife was often 
married late in life, and that sons often died young, through illness or war. The 
political situation was at its most fluid after the death of a chief. The superior 
rank of tlze Great Wife could be challenged by a subsequent bride. It might be alleged 
that the chief was not the real father of the Great Son, or that he had disowned the 
heir-apparent's wife before his death. A contender could be eliminated through a 
witchcraft accusation. It was even possible to depose a recognized chief, and once 
this was accomplished a reason could always be found-. Chiefs have been deposed or 
superseded for being "cruel", flstingyfl, or even llslxpidn. It is impossible to know 
to what extent such reasons are simply rationales. In oral societies even more than 
literate ones it is the victors who record the history. Genealogies, for instance, are 
less accurate chronicles of genetic relationships than indices of relative political 
standing. To give two examples from Xhosa history: the chief Mdange, born a minor 
son, is today remembered as a Eight-Hand Son, and the upstart Mhala is regarded as the 
Great Son of Ndlambe. Political competition of this nature permitted the most capable 
chiefs to rise to the highest positions and reduced the likelihood of well-born 
incompetents holding office for very long. W e n  more important was the way in which the 
councillors could exploit competition between the chiefs in their struggle against the 
attempt of -bhe chiefs to expand the sphere of their domination. 
Since chiefs were unable to retain their position t h r o w  economic or 
military means, they relied largely on ideological sanctions and political 
manipulation. The chief played a vital role in the first-fruits (fertility) ritual, 
was doctored with exclusive magical medicines, and commanded the support of the 
diviners (tlwitchdoctorslf). On the political level, they manipulated the competition 
of the councillors for their favour and benefited from their internal dissensions. 
They made sure that the councillors Phared whatever tribute, gifts or boofy was 
collected. They also exhibited a sense of group solidarity which limited the extent 
to which their internal squabbles damaged their group interests. Chief Ndlambe once 
told his victorious amy not to pursue his mortal enemy, Ngqika, because, in his words, 
"That is a chief, and you are only ordinary black ment1. All chiefs exacted tribute, 
which meat that, although a commoner could escape a particular chief, he could not 
escape being dominated by the chiefs as a group. 
There can be no doubt that immediately before the Colonial conquest the 
chiefly group was on the offensive. The effect of the Mfecane (~shakals wars) was to 
reverse the material conditions which had weakened chieftainship. Land was no longer 
sparsely populated, as people clustered together for defence, and inter-chiefly rivalry 
within individual polities was severely curtailed. Chiefs such as Tshaka and Mswati 
took advantage of these circumstances to expad their control over produc-%ion and even 
women (the means of reproduction). For instance, they directly aepropriated and 
redistributed labour, land, cattle, and women, something the Xhosa chiefs were never 
able to do. Yet there are signs that the Xhosa were moving in the same direction, and. 
aggressive and enterprising chiefs such as Hintsa and Ngqika succeeded in increasing 
their political prerogatives at the expense of their councillors. Nevertheless, by 
the time the pre-colonial period came to an end, the power of the chiefs among the 
Xhosa was by no means as fully established as it had become among the northern Nguni, 
and the chiefs were usually compelled to obtain consensus support from the 
councillors for measures that they wished approved. 
The Assault on Chiefship 
The basic objects of nineteenth century Colonial policy towards the Ciskei 
(ll~ritish Kaffraria") after its annexation in 1847 were enunciated as follows by 
Charles Brownlee: "whatever tends to elevate and Christianize the Natives, whatever 
tends to diminish the power of the chiefs, whatever tends to increase the immovable 
or not readily movable property of the  native^.^! (8) The close connection between 
ideological, political and economic factors was very clearly perceived, and every 
opportunity was taken to induce a taste for European goods, private property and 
elected representation. The survival of chiefship during this period should be seen 
as part of the wider resistance of Africans to the imposition of Colonial control 
rather than as support for chiefship as such. Chiefship was supported because it was 
the symbolic focus of the cultural, religious, political and economic life of the 
people, and because the chiefs were in the forefront of resistance to the Europeans. 
Chiefship in the Ciskei 
This is not the place to summarize or take up a position on the voluminous 
and controversial literature concerning the introduction of the policy of separate 
development. Suffice it to say that,by 1948, the chiefs no longer posed a military 
threat to the European-dominated South African government, a& the government, for 
its part, no longer thought to extirpate chiefship and the way of life it represented. 
Moreover, the focus of conflict had shifted to South Africa's great industrial 
complexes, and away from the rural frontiers of the initial settlements. 
The tribulations of chiefship during the "liberalf1 interregnum, and the 
consequent support chiefship had received from the rural masses, had camouflaged a 
very material shift in the pre-colonial power balance between chief and people. It 
will be recalled that the strength of the people vis-a-vis the chiefs had rested on 
four premises: (i) abundance of land; (ii) shortage of people; (iii) dependence of 
the chief on councillors and people for military support; (iv) rivalry between chiefs. 
Premises (i) and (ii) had disappeared through Colonial land confiscation and population 
increase. Premises (iii) and (tv) had disappeared through the Colonial interdiction 
on trials of military strength. On the other hand, the chief was still able to wield 
his old ideological a3ld political weapons, albeit in a modified form. Ideologically, 
he presented himself as the "father of the people", who had presided over the llhappy 
community11 of what appeared in retrospect as the "good old days". In fact, as we have 
seen, it was not the chief but the councillors who had been the guarantors of the 
peoplels rights. Politically, the chief was a schemer as before, but whereas he had 
previously intrigued among the councillors, these were now powerless and he turned his 
attention to magistrates and government ethnologists, presenting them with genealogical 
and territorial claims which they found difficult to verify or reject. With regard to 
the possession of legitimate force, the chief had none of his own and was forced to 
rely on that of the South African state, a situation which placed him in a dependent 
position. 
One stated purpose of the system of Bantu Authorities (Bantu Authorities Act 
1951) was to revive the institution of chiefship as an instrument of national -. 
regeneration, in the hope that this would lead to a more positive attitude than had 
been evinced under the old council system. (9) Since the personnel of the old council 
system was much the same as that of the new Tribal Authority (hereafter T/A) system 
and since their powers vis-a-vis the wider South African context were also much the 
same, this was being rather over-optimistic (if not insincere). In fact, the principal 
consequence of the new policy was to redefine the perimeters and rules of the political 
m n a .  The South African Government did face certain difficulties with regard to 
rationalizing chiefly authority so that it fitted the requirements of the state. 
There was the genuine problem of assimilating a patrimonial system of authority to 
bureaucratic principles. But, on the other hand, these difficulties provided a 
series of opportunities which have been utilized by the chiefs as an instrument of 
political competition and by the Government as an instrument of political control. 
In fact, the issue of chiefship in the Ciskei is a prime example of the way in which 
ideological argument m a y  be used as the language through which the real stuff of 
politics - competition for power - is conducted and, at the same time, concealed. 
In setting up the T/AS, the Department of Bmtu Administration and 
Development (BAD) was confronted by the problems of identifying chiefs and defining 
the territorial limits of their authority. Its theoretical approach to this problem 
is indicated in the following statement by one of its ethnologists: 
The recognition or appointment of chiefs is in fact 
an administrative act that depends an a number of 
practical considerations. For example, the claimant's 
right to be regarded as a chief must be demonstrated 
genealogically. He must have a sufficiently large 
following, and his following must have its own 
territory in which it lives. He must be either 
independent of other chiefs, or recognized as a chief 
by a superior or paramount chief. Some of the tribal 
entities ... do not meet the requirements. A number 
of them are foreign enclaves with their own hereditary 
heads, living as subjects of other tribes. (10) 
Where recognized chiefs already existed, it was easy enough to recognize them as 
heads of tribal authorities. But since there were not enough recognized chiefs to 
operate the system (in Keiskammahoek District there was not a single recognized chief), 
and since there were a number of lollg-standing chieftaincy claims, the question of 
chiefship had to be reopened. 
In pre-colonial times, all sons of chiefs became chiefs. The Great Son (or 
heir) and Ri&t-Hand (or second-ranking) Son were usually the most important, but 
other sons could claim chiefship for their ixhiba (f'grandfatherw) and iqadi ("minorff) 
houses. Claims were often beefed up by connecting ancestors to higher-ranking houses 
which had died out. For instance, no fewer than five sons of Ngqika (~andile, Maqoma, 
'Pyhali, Dondashe , Anta) (11) established chief ships which are generally recognized 
today. Oral genealogies are notoriously unreliable, and many were never recorded in 
writing. Because of this it was difficult for the best intentioned of ethnologists 
to draw a hard and fast line between a legitimate claimant and a faction led by a 
commoner member of the royal clan. In addition, the BAD had to pass judgement on 
internal dynastic quarrels, such as that which had divided the aanaHleke of Pirie 
Location, King ~illiam's Town (henceforth KWT) District, into two parties, each 
recognizing a different chief - neither of whom was the headman. Nor was it easy to 
determine whether a given claimant was the legitimate but unrecognized chief of an 
independent chiefdom or the "hereditary headw of a subject "foreign enclave", since 
the claimant would inevitably maintain the former while his nominal superior would 
inevitably maintain the latter. The situation was even more complicated with regard 
to the Mfengu, who have no single royal house. 
Furthermore, location boundaries did not a l w s  coincide with chiefly 
allegiances. In Peelton Location, KWT District, the imiDange and MNgqalasi 
chiefdoms were intermingled and at odds. At the other extreme, Chief Ngwenyathi 
Makinana of the m d l a m b e  ruled the whole of Mdantsane District, an area obviously 
too large to be administered by a single T/A. In the old Ngqika areas, particularly 
in Victoria East District, there were scattered pockets of Xhosa living under Mfengu 
chiefs and headmen. 
These difficulties only became significant with the gsanting of internal 
self-government to the Ciskei in 1968. Here the politics of chiefship intersected 
with the politics of ethnicity. The rising tide of ethnic hostility manifested 
itself in the 1973 election, with the formation of the mainly Mfengu Mabandla group 
(later the Ciskei National Party - CW) and the mainly Xhosa Sebe group (later the 
Ciskei National Independence Party - CNIP). The contest between the two was very 
close, and the Ciskei Legislative Assembly (30 chiefs, 20 elected members) elected 
Sebe as Pr.be Minister by a margin of only 26 votes to 24. (12) The Sebe group had 
won a convincing majority (13-7) of the elected members and could claim with some 
justification that Wbandlats strength lay primarily in the fact that a 
disproportionate number of the recognized chiefs were Mfengu. Eight chiefship 
applications were pending (7 Xhosa and 1 Mfengu, who turned out to be a Sebe 
supporter), and it should be clear that if they were granted this would have the 
effect of making the Ciskei safe for Sebe. The fact that they were indeed granted, 
taken together with the conviction of several BAD officials for electoral 
irregularities on behalf of the Sebe group, seems to point to Government support for 
Sebe. There can be no doubt that there were ample ethnic grounds for the recognition 
of these chieftaincies, five of which (imiNgcangethelo, amaGqunukhwebe-Phato, 
imillushane-&asana, imDange, imiNgqalasi) were flenclaveslf and two of which (ama~wali, 
amaJingqi) were resuscitated Xhosa chiefships which are being reconstituted in Victoria 
East at the expense of'the Mfengu. It is also clear that five of the seven claimants 
had unquestionable rights to the chiefship. But there were other applications, such 
as that of Welcome Fhyanda, headman of Qugqwala location, KWT District, and regarded 
as chief by the surrounding Mfengu locations, which were turned down. According to 
government figures (131, Mnyanda has more subjects and a bigger territory than any of 
the newly recognized chiefs, except the imiNgcangathelo. This gives rise to the 
suspicion that Fhyanda was turned down (as a Mfengu, he might be considered a 
potential Mabmdla supporter) on political rather than ethnographic grounds. The 
biggest losers by the introduction of the new chiefdoms were Chief Mabavldla himself 
and Chief Winana (a Rharhabe, but a Mabandla supporter), both of whom had two new 
T/AS carved out of their territory. 
ioth Ciskeian parties are committed to chiefship and mention it specifically 
in their platforms. This is not simply for electoral purposes, but because,no matter 
which chiefly group (~ebet S or Mabandlat S) is currently in favour with the Republican 
government, both depend on it for the perpetuation of the status and privileges they 
enjoy at the expense of their people. The CNIP  was able to make considerable 
political capital out of Mabandlats opposition to the installation of the eight chiefs, 
and claimed that he was opposed to the institution of chiefship itself. (14) Mabandla 
was unable to reply to these charges, but had a traditional card of his own to play. 
Among his few Rharhabe supporters was no less a personage than the Rharhabe Paramount, 
Mxolisi Sandile ( g  ~azindlovu!) himself. Mxolisits opposition was popularly ascribed 
to the influence of his Chief Councillor, Isaac Sangotsha, but it is worth remarking 
that, with the exception of the Transkei, the relations between Homelands governments 
and Paramount Chiefs have always been tense. This is certainly the case in KwaZulu 
and Lebowa, and is also true of the analogous situation in Lesotho. Before the 
Legislative Assembly was due to elect the Prime Minister, Mxolisi and two other pro- 
Mabandla Rharhabe chiefs made a last-ditch appeal to chiefly solidarity, arguing that 
if Sebe, whom they alleged to be a commoner, was elected Prime Minister, "the whole 
structure of chieftainship would collapsev. Sebe denied that he was a commoner and 
accused the Paramount of meddling in Ciskei politics. (15) The attitude of the CNIP 
was thaL Ifin any country, the King or Paramount Chief was above party politics" (16), 
an argument also used by the rulers of KwaZulu and Lesotho, but not, it should be 
noted, by those of the Transkei, Botswana or Swaeilaand. 
Despite his electoral success, it would appear that Sebels inferior status 
rankled. He applied for chiefship, and this was duly granted. It is not clear how he 
justified his application to the BAD, but he claimed in March 1977 that his great- 
grandfather had died of bullet wounds defending Chief Phatho of the Gqunukwebe during 
the War of the Axe, and that his descendants had been awarded a chiefship in 
reqognition of this. Although this is entirely possible in terms of traditional 
practice, there is no good traditional reason why Sebets chiefship should be recognized 
today, ahead of Phathots Right-Hand House, or any of Phatho's other biological 
descendants. The claim of the house of Sebe to the land and. people whom the Chief 
Minister had earmarked for himself is likewise obscure. In view of public scepticism, 
Sebe seems to have felt obliged to beef up his claim, and he was presented at his 
installation as biologically descended from the first Gqunukwebe chief, linking up 
genealogically as the son of Chief 'Icyarha, who lived around the middle of the eighteenth 
century and concerning whom absolutely nothing is known. (17) The family tree of the 
house of Anta may also soon be acquiring a new offshoot in the person of M r  Sipho Tanana 
of Mdantsane. Chief Sebe and Regent Maqoma (of whom more will be heard later) have 
supported his claim to the chiefship of Antals people, the amaGwelane, ahead of the 
otherwise universally recognized chief who is still living in the Transkei. Sebels 
support of Tanana may not be entirely unconnected with the fact that Tanana is the 
leader of the Sebe loyalists on the Mdantsane City Council, stronghold of the 
breakawa~r Siyo group. (18) 
A final insight into the interplay between the ideology of tradition and the 
realities of political power is afforded by the struggle for the regency which occurred 
after the death of Paramount Mxolisi Sandile on 5 April 1976. (19) His heir, Maxhoba- 
Ayakhawuleza, who is in his early twenties, but had not yet been circumcised, was 
residing in Mgwali Location, Stutterheim District, and being trained for the chiefship 
by Chief Mpangele, a Rharhabe chief who had been swnmoned from the Transkei for this 
purpose. Mxolisi's family were strongly of the opinion that his widow, Nolizwe, should 
act as regent until their son came of age. The majority of the Rharhabe chiefs, who 
were CNIP supporters, saw the opportunity of getting rid of the embarrassing anomaly of 
a Paramount who supported the opposition. They constituted themselves into the "Ftharhabe 
Tribunal1' and elected the Jingqi chief, Lent Maqoma, as regent. The CNP faction, which 
backed Nolizwe, called themselves the "Rharhabe Privy Council". It won the support of 
Xolilizwe Sigcawu, the Gcaleka Paramount in the Transkei, and of the Rharhabe chiefs 
still resident in the Transkei. (20) Since Xolilizwe is, to put it kindly, a political 
cipher, it is easy to see the hand of the Transkei government, which is hostile to Sebe. 
Both the Tribunal and the Privy Council held meetings at the Great Place without 
attending those of the other group, and both made public announcements on behalf or'the 
atmRharhabe as a whole. In fact, both were waiting for the announcement from Pretoria 
which would decide the issue. Not surprisingly, in view of its past support for the 
CNIP, the Republican State President, in his capacity of Supreme Chief of the Bantu, 
approved the appointment of Maqoma as from 26 August 1976. The CNP faction had Maxhoba- 
Ayakhawuleza circumcised with all speed, but it appears that the Chief Minister and the 
Regent are of the opinion that he will not have attained his majority until he is married. 
There are still many Xhosa who remain deeply attached to the ideology of 
chiefly dignity and consensus. & did not mention the party political dimensions of 
the regency struggle at all. The introduction of party politics was blamed for this 
sordid little comedy, and reference was made to the fact that in the good old w s  such 
things never happened. The contending parties themselves set great store by the ideology 
of tradition and were careful to justify their procedure with reference to traditional 
precedents. But, whereas the Privy Council group pointed to cases of female regencies, 
urged the sanctity of the dying wishes of the deceased and those of his family, and 
insisted that it was the function of the senior Gcaleka Paramount to give judgement on 
tricky legal points, the Tribunal pointed to the years 1829 to 1842 when a Maqoma had 
been regent for a Sandile, urged that it was the task of the chiefs to choose their 
regent, and insisted that the amaRharhabe were completely independent of the e a l e k a .  
It would be absurd to ask which of these versions was closer to traditional procedure. 
As has already been indicated, traditional society was no static entity which adhered 
fixedly to set rules, but a dynamic and keenly competitive society which adapted its 
rules to suit changing circumstances. Had such a dispute broken out in pre-colonial 
times, it would undoubtedly have been settled by recourse to war. This would have been 
perfectly democratic, as the most popular candidate would have commanded the most spears. 
But once the democratic basis of chiefship was removed and the opinion of councillors 
and people had ceased to matter, the contest was bound to be fought on the level of 
official recognition, because it is precisely on this basis that chiefship now rests. 
The change in the material basis of chiefship has affected not only the 
relationship of chief with chief but also the relationship of chief with commoner. The 
main factors underlying this change have already been analysed, and it remains to 
discuss its material manifestations. What concrete powers do the chiefs have over their 
subjects? 
Their main duty is to enforce the various laws and, inasmuch as these do 
not give them more than police powers, their functions in this respect are simply 
police functions. (21) Their main area of discretion lies in the judicial field, 
where the T/A court hears disputes arising out of customaqy law. The way in which 
these powers can be misused is illustrated in a memorandum written on behalf of the 
Hlubi chief ?#ayanda, applying for the establishment of a separate T/A. (22) His 
contentions are interesting, irrespective of their truth, because they outline the 
1 possibilities open to a chief who wishes to impose his authority on a recalcitrant 1 headman. According to the memorandum: (a) the headman cannot get his sub-committees 
recognized (or funded) by the chief; (b) in cases which appear before the chiefls 
court, decisions go constantly against the headman and his supporters; (c) the chiefls 
court has convicted the headman for offences (assault, holding illegal meetings) he 
I did not commit; (d) the headmanls own convictions are set aside on appeal to the 
chiefts court; (e) the chief encourages dissident elements within the headmants 
I location; (f) the headman and his councillors are exposed to public insult and 
humiliation at the chiefls Great Place. These allegations do not amount to more than 
, harassment, as the headman was able to appeal the decisions of the chief to the 
I magistratels court. In this respect, it is significant that some CNIP members have 
I requested the abolition of this right of appeal. (23) 
Ordinary commoners are far worse off than headmen. Their old representatives, 
the councillors, no longer-protect them, since a chiefls council is now more liable 
than ever to be made up of his personal dependants. Sub-headmen are appointed by the 
chief independently of the administration, and, although many of these are still clan- 
section heads, this, like consensus, is a tradition the material basis of which has 
fallen a w .  Although the councillors of the T/A are elected, the elected members by 
no means form the majority of the chiefts council, which is not fixed but fluctuating 
in number. Usually, a chiefls council is made up largely of his personal friends and 
of those who have made it their business to hang around his Great Place and share in 
whatever gifts come his way. 
The chief may abuse his judicial power to persecute dissident individuals, 
as in the case of the headman mentioned above. There are limitations: the trial is 
, not a kangaroo court, but takes place in the T/A building before the elected council, 
and the decisions can be appealed to the magistrate. But it should be emphasized 
that only an extremely enterprising individual who is unusually aware of his statutory 
rights would be prepared to take on the risks and costs involved, unless, like the 
headman, he has substantial and higkly motivated popular support. Even if a subject 
successfully opposed his chief, he could be exposed to persistent harassment and could 
I be deprived of the many little services which chiefs normally provide for their 
subjects (e.g. the chief often helps his subjects obtain pensions, and he assists them 
in meeting their bridewealth obligations). It is difficult, however, for a chief to 
impose a punishment more severe than that of a fine. The chief's control of the land 
l does not give him the right to expel long-standing residents, For instance, when Chief 
Komani of the immgqalasi wished to rid himself of Mr N. L. Magwaaya of Peelton, he had 
to go through the magistrate of Zwelitsha. (24) Nevertheless, threats of expulsion 
I are effective enough to be em loyed in elections. With regard to corporal punishment, 
the decision of the Ntinde T i  to give Mr K. Mahayiya ten lashes for ploughing on 
S W  gave rise to a public outcry, and M r  Mahayiya took up the matter with 
attorneys. (25) ' 
i The ability of the chiefs to deliver the vote in elections has not been 
demonstrated. The Mfengu chiefs of Victoria East were unable to secure the election 
of the CNP candidates during the 1973 election. Of the four constituencies which 
elect only one representative to the Legislative Assembly, two have their elected 
representative and their chief sitting on opposite sides of the house, though in both 
(~ewu, ~eiskammahoek) special circumstances have to be taken into account. 
Conclusions 
The purposes of this paper have been threefold. First, it has sou&t to 
S 
set out little known and inaccessible information about Ciskeian chiefship. Second, 
it has attempted to show that ideology (in this case, the rules and procedures of the 
"traditional way of life") does not dictate political action, but that political 
action can always legitimate itself t h r o w  one ideological rationalization or 
another. This was true of pre-colonial society in its succession disputes, and it 
is equally true of chiefly disputes within the framework of homeland politics today. 
$imilarly, the pm-colonial ideas of consensus and good government stemmed from a 
situation where the chiefs were unable to subordinate the people and their 
representatives, the councillors. Third, it has attempted to show that one cannot 
divorce the political forms of chiefship from their material base and still expect 
them to retain their old vitality. Pre-colonial chiefship was a multivalent 
institution linking economics, politics and religion. The nineteenth century 
Colonial administrators understood this, and struck at all three simultaneously. 
The Republican government's support of chiefship could not alter (and, indeed, has 
probably resulted from) the fact that the material bases of chiefship Bad changed. 
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